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Abstract 
This paper uses national accounts data to adjust market and disposable Top 10% and Top 1% 
household survey income shares for 39 developed and developing countries that are part of the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). An additional novelty of this study is the distinction between 
labor and capital income. The obtained results suggest that for most countries top income 
shares are significantly higher than those reported in household surveys, which mainly 
underestimate top capital income. While the presented results should be treated with some 
caution, our easy-to-implement approach seems suitable for countries for which no tax data is 
available. 
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1. Introduction 
Income inequality within countries demonstrated a sharp upward trend from 1975 onwards. 
This is especially true for developed countries, but also when measured at the global level 
(OECD, 2015; Goda, 2016). Recent research shows that this increase in inequality has had 
adverse effects on health and social cohesion (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011; Stiglitz, 2012; 
Atkinson, 2015), financial stability (Kumhof et al., 2015; Stockhammer, 2015; Goda et al., 
2017), and economic growth (Herzer and Vollmer, 2012; 2013; Halter et al., 2014; Onaran and 
Galanis, 2014). Moreover, it negatively influences democratic decision-making processes by 
augmenting the lobbying power of the elites (Esteban and Ray, 2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2008; Crotty, 2012; Gilens and Page, 2014). Consequently, there is a growing perception that 
the topic needs much more attention and is among the most pressing current global challenges 
(Obama, 2011; Lagarde, 2013; OECD, 2015; Piketty, 2015; Oxfam, 2014; 2017). 
Typically, within-country income inequality estimates are based on household survey data. 
However, it is well documented that these tend to underestimate income at the top of the 
distribution, so that an increasing number of studies attempt to adjust the top income data that 
is reported in household surveys (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; 2010; Atkinson et al., 2011; 
Lakner and Milanovic, 2013; 2016; Ruiz and Woloszko, 2016; Alvaredo et al., 2017b). For this 
adjustment process tax data is often used, which has the disadvantage that the coverage, 
definition, and valuation of income depends on each nation’s tax laws and that many 
assumptions and data interpolations are necessary to homogenize the data (see Alvaredo et al., 
2017a). Moreover, tax data is not readily available for many countries, and it is well known that 
households with especially high income often avoid and evade tax payments. 
A second limitation of the existing literature is that it does not distinguish between inequality 
prior to and after government intervention (i.e. existing estimates focus either on pre-tax or 
disposable income). The aim of this paper is to adjust household survey market and disposable 
top income shares for a sample of 39 developed and developing countries. Market income (i.e. 
labor and capital income) refers to income prior to government intervention, while disposable 
income (market income net of social security contributions and income taxes, plus transfer 
income) refers to income after government intervention. 
More specifically, we use a Pareto interpolation method to adjust the top income data from 
the latest available household surveys of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) with the 
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respective household income aggregates from the System of National Accounts (SNA). The 
reliance on SNA data has the advantage that it allows for the retrieval of estimates for countries 
for which tax data is not available, which is the case for more than half of our sample countries, 
and that it is relatively easy to implement. An additional novelty of our paper is the distinction 
between capital and labor income during the adjustment process. We expect that most of the 
adjustment will take place due to underreported capital income on the grounds that wealth is 
highly concentrated at the top (see Piketty (2014) and Goda (2017)).  
Our results suggest that for most countries the adjusted top income shares are significantly 
higher than those reported in LIS household surveys. This is especially true for the developing 
countries of our sample, whereas in Canada, Japan, and the Nordic countries no or only 
relatively small adjustments are necessary. The main adjustment takes place due to an 
underestimation of top capital income. A comparison with existing top income share estimates 
suggest that our methodology neither yields an upward or downward bias. However, the 
presented top income shares should be treated as rough estimates, considering the available data 
and the issue that no objective criteria exist to define how much of the income difference 
between national accounts and household surveys should be attributed to top earners. Having 
said this, the obtained results suggest that our easy-to-implement approach is a suitable way to 
derive adjusted top income shares for countries that do not provide or have reliable tax data. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section Two briefly discusses prevalent 
issues concerning household surveys and the limitations of existing top income estimates. 
Section Three presents the research design used to adjust the household survey data with official 
national accounts data. Section Four presents the adjusted market and disposable income shares, 
and compares the latter with the top income share estimates of the World Wealth & Income 
Database (WID)1. Section Five draws conclusions. 
 
  
 
1 The WID project was founded under the name World Top Incomes Database (WTID).  
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2. Limitations of existing top income estimates 
Data on income inequality is retrieved mainly from household surveys, which are known to 
under-represent both low income and top income households; very poor households often lack 
a registered address, and very rich households are not easily accessible and tend not to respond. 
Hence, household surveys typically oversample top income households. However, particularly 
among the upper tail of the distribution, misreporting is also prevalent, whether deliberately or 
due to ignorance. It is thus well established that inequality estimates based on household survey 
data underestimate the degree of income at the very top (Groves and Couper, 1998; Atkinson 
and Brandolini, 2001; Deaton, 2005; Atkinson and Piketty, 2007). 
To adjust household survey top income shares, tax data is typically used (Atkinson and 
Piketty 2007; 2010). This data has the advantage that its declaration is not voluntary so that, in 
principle, all top income households should be covered by the sample. However, it has the 
disadvantage that the definition and valuation of income depends on each nation’s tax laws, 
that non-tax filers are not included, and that the very rich sections of society, often successfully, 
try to avoid and evade tax payments (Leigh, 2007; Lakner and Milanovic, 2013; 2016). The 
latter point is of particular importance: Zucman (2013) estimates that $5.9 trillion of assets are 
held offshore and that at least 75% of these assets are not reported, whereas other estimates 
suggest that rich individuals are hiding between US$ 12 trillion (Palan et al., 2010) and US$ 21 
trillion (Henry, 2012) in tax havens. 
To overcome these issues, the newest version of the widely used WID attempts to 
homogenize the observation units (adults that are ≥20 years old), and to use generalized Pareto 
interpolation methods to correct the reported taxable income to match the income totals that are 
reported in the national accounts (see Alvaredo et al., 2017a). Moreover, it aims to correct for 
tax underreporting by considering Zucman’s (2013; 2014) offshore wealth estimates. However, 
even with these considerable improvements, WID’s reliance on tax data still has the 
disadvantage that this is not available for all countries, and that its usage requires many 
assumptions and data interpolations. 
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Accordingly, Lakner and Milanovic (2013; 2016) prefer to solely rely on systems of national 
accounts data to adjust disposable top income shares.2 SNA data has the advantage that it tracks 
all money flows within an economy, including the income that goes to top income households 
(Deaton, 2005). Moreover, SNA data is readily available for most countries, its reporting 
guidelines are standardized across all countries, and the adjustment is easy to implement. 
Accordingly, Campos Vázquez and Chavez (2016) use a similar approach to adjust Mexico’s 
top income shares. However, Lakner and Milanovic (2016) find that their methodology in some 
cases leads to adjustments that seem excessive. 
Finally, Ruiz and Woloszko (2016) neither rely on tax nor on SNA data but instead use 
West’s (1986) conditional likelihood estimator to adjust pre-tax household survey income. To 
be able to do so, they assume that the Pareto law applies for all incomes above the median. This 
assumption is questionable, given that most literature finds that the Pareto law only applies to 
top incomes and that other distribution types are more appropriate to calculate incomes below 
the top. 
Despite their different methodologies, existing studies have in common that they do not 
distinguish between different types of income. This is an important limitation, given that it can 
be expected that capital income is more important for top income households than for ‘ordinary’ 
households, because the former are the ones that own most financial assets (see Shorrocks et 
al. (2016) and Goda (2017)). Another limitation of existing studies is that they do not consider 
pre-government intervention inequality (i.e. market top income shares). 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Market and disposable income sources 
As mentioned in the introduction, this study considers two different income concepts: market 
income and disposable income. To obtain the latest available household survey income, LIS’s 
database is used because it is “the largest available income database of harmonised microdata” 
(LIS, 2017). The survey data is obtained as income percentile averages (!" …!"$$). For the 
 
2 Please note that, depending on data availability, Lakner and Milanovic (2013; 2016) use a mix of disposable 
income and consumption data for their estimates.  
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adjustment process, on the other hand, SNA household income aggregates are derived from 
UNdata, OECD.stat, and Eurostat (see Table 1 for an overview). To make LIS’s survey data 
and the SNA aggregates comparable, LIS’s income percentiles are multiplied by the one percent 
of total households. 
Table 1: Sample overview 
Country Year SNA Source Income Estimates Number of Households 
Household Size 
Source 
Australia 2010 OECD B2n, B3n, D1, D4 7,760,332 UN 
Austria 2013 Eurostat B3n 3,474,800 IPUMS 
Belgium 2000 Eurostat B3n 4,384,200 IPUMS 
Brazil 2013 UN B3n 58,145,560 IPUMS 
Canada 2010 OECD B2n, B3n, D1, D4 13,320,600 UN 
China 2002 UN B3n 355,613,241 IPUMS 
Colombia 2013 UN B3n 10,570,900 UN 
Czech Republic 2013 Eurostat B3n 4,582,800 IPUMS 
Denmark 2013 Eurostat B3n 2,313,700 IPUMS 
Egypt 2012 UN B3n 17,404,140 IPUMS 
Estonia 2013 Eurostat B3n 582,000 UN 
France 2010 Eurostat B3n 27,205,100 IPUMS 
Finland 2013 Eurostat B3n 2,571,000 IPUMS 
Germany 2013 Eurostat B2n, B3n 39,410,700 IPUMS 
Greece 2013 Eurostat B3n 4,352,600 IPUMS 
Guatemala 2006 UN B3n 2,921,300 NAKONO 
Hungary 2012 Eurostat B3n 4,085,500 IPUMS 
Iceland 2010 UN B3n 128,700 OECD 
India 2011 UN B3n 230,126,806 IPUMS 
Ireland 2010 Eurostat B2n, B3n 1,689,000 IPUMS 
Italy 2014 Eurostat B3n 24,669,800 IPUMS 
Japan 2008 UN B3n 51,842,300 UN 
Luxembourg 2007 UN B3n 204,900 IPUMS 
Mexico 2012 UN B3n 29,036,410 IPUMS 
Netherlands 2013 Eurostat B3n 7,548,800 IPUMS 
Norway 2013 Eurostat B3n 2,224,200 UN 
Peru 2013 UN P51c, B3n 8,216,750 IPUMS 
Poland 2013 UN B3n 13,660,100 IPUMS 
Romania 1997 UN B3n 7,320,160 IPUMS 
Russia 2013 UN B3n 54,560,600 UN 
Serbia 2010 UN B3n 2,487,900 UN 
Slovak Republic 2013 Eurostat B3n 1,754,100 IPUMS 
Slovenia 2012 Eurostat B3n 842,300 IPUMS 
South Africa 2012 UN B3n 17,258,500 IPUMS 
South Korea 2012 OECD B3n 11,202,500 UN 
Spain 2013 Eurostat B3n 18,212,400 IPUMS 
Sweden 2005 Eurostat B3n 4,248,700 IPUMS 
United Kingdom 2013 Eurostat B2n, B3n 27,610,900 IPUMS 
United States 2013 UN B3n 119,778,900 IPUMS 
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SNA data has the advantage that the reporting rules are standardized across countries, that it 
is easily accessible and that it captures all income flows. It considers, for example, the income 
from the sale of illegal drugs and stolen property, which is unlikely to be reported in household 
surveys and is definitely not reported in tax records. Having said this, the reliance on SNA data 
also has some disadvantages. First, countries often do not report data for income subcategories. 
Second, although SNA has standardized reporting rules, the compilation of the data differs 
between countries, which means that, for example, the distinction between self-employed and 
firms differs between countries. Moreover, it is not clear how reliable the information on mixed-
income is, given that it is a residual that balances the national account. However, despite these 
issues, the reliance on SNA data is an interesting alternative way to adjust survey top income 
shares, given that the adjustment procedure is easy to implement and that it allows for the 
retrieval of estimates for countries for which tax data is not available (this is the case for 54% 
of our sample countries).  
SNA data can be used for the adjustment of household survey data, given that the sum of 
market household survey income3 in the i-th country is approximately equivalent to the 
following SNA primary resource incomes of households (sector S.14): 
&'()*+	-./01*2 = 412 + 442 + 82.2 + 83.2 (1) 
where 41 is compensation of employees, 44 is property income, 82. is net operating surplus 
(i.e. rental income from housing), and 83. is net mixed income (i.e. self-employed income). 
In other words, 41 is labor income, 44 + 82.  is capital income, and 83. is a mixture of 
labor and capital income. 
Total disposable household survey income4 in the i-th country, on the other hand, is 
approximately equivalent to the following SNA secondary resource income of households: 
4;<=0<'>?*	-./01*2 = 86.2 (2) 
 
3 The labor income that is reported in LIS (il) includes all “monetary payments and value of non-monetary goods 
and services received from dependent employment” and “profits/losses and value of goods for own consumption 
from self-employment”, whereas LIS capital income (ic) relates to “monetary payments from property and capital 
(including financial and non-financial assets). 
4 The disposable income that is reported in LIS (dhi) is the sum of labor income (il), capital income (ic) and transfer 
income (it), minus income taxes (xiti) and social security contributions (xits). 
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where 86. is net disposable income (which includes market income, social benefits, net private 
transfers, net social contributions, and taxes on income and wealth).  
Unfortunately, only gross values of mixed income (83A) are publicly available. 
Furthermore, the consumption data of fixed capital on gross mixed income (!51/2) is also 
unavailable. However, total household consumption of fixed capital (!51/) data is available 
for most countries. Hence, we assume that households’ !51/2 is related to the proportion of 
mixed income to total household income that is affected by depreciation (!51/2 = !51/ ∗(82A/(82A + 83A)). The estimated consumption of fixed capital on mixed income is then used 
to obtain net mixed income (83A − !51/2). 
To include as many countries as possible in our sample we make some further estimations 
of SNA data (see Table 1 for an overview), by considering the values of countries with similar 
characteristics to those with missing data as a benchmark. To be more precise, for Australia, 
Canada and South Korea only the data of combined income of households and non-profit 
institutions is available (S.14+S.15). In the case of Australia and Canada we assume that the 
proportion of S.14 on this sum is the same as in the USA (98%), while Japan is used as 
benchmark in the case of South Korea (96%). Furthermore, we assume for Australia and 
Canada that 83A (11%), 41 (71%) and 44 (11%) have the same proportion of primary income 
(85A) than in the USA. 
For Germany, Ireland and the UK only the data for the sum of 82.+	83. is available. In the 
case of Germany, we assume that 83. has the same proportion of this sum as in Austria (62%), 
while for Ireland and the UK we take the same proportion as the one found in the USA (57%). 
Finally, for Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru and China the data of !51/ is not available. For 
the four Latin American countries the same rate of depreciation as in Mexico is assumed (12%), 
while for China the rate for India is taken as a benchmark (11%). After these adjustments, both 
LIS and SNA data is available for a sample of 39 countries. 
 
3.2 Adjustment of LIS top income shares 
Each country’s household survey income is subtracted from the household income listed in 
(1) and (2). The obtained difference is the so called residual. A positive residual implies that 
the income of households that is reported in SNA is higher than the income that is reported in 
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LIS’s household surveys, i.e. that especially income at the top is underreported in the survey 
(as discussed in Section 2). In all but five countries (Canada, Finland, Japan, Iceland, and 
Sweden) the residual is positive. The five countries with a negative residual have in common 
that their survey is combined with information from administrative tax registers. In line with 
Lakner and Milanovic (2013; 2016) no adjustments are made when the residual is negative. 
It is well established in the literature that the income distribution at the top follows a Pareto 
distribution. Hence, we first use the residual to calculate the Pareto coefficient, and then 
distribute the residual to each percentile of the Top 10% income according to the calculated 
Pareto coefficient. Relative income shares of the Pareto distribution can be expressed as follows 
(see Atkinson, 2007): 
GHGI = JHJI KLMK  (3) 
where N2 is the i-th LIS top income share adjusted by the residual, NO is the j-th LIS top income 
share adjusted by the residual, and  P2 and PO are the respective proportions of the population 
that hold these income shares.  
Given that N2, NO,	P2 and PO are known, the Pareto coefficient (Q) can be estimated as follows: 
Q = ""R( ST N; LST UIST VH LST VI ) (4) 
We use the Top 10% and Top 5% income shares (i.e., P2 = 0.05 and PO = 0.10) to estimate 
the Pareto coefficient, which is in line with Atkinson (2007). After having obtained the Pareto 
coefficient from (4), the cumulative top shares are derived solving for N2 in (3). The shares of 
each percentile below the highest share (!"$$) can then easily be calculated by subtracting from 
each percentile share the next highest percentile share (!"$$RY = N"ZY − N"ZYZ"). 
As mentioned in the introduction, a novelty of our study is that we adjust capital and labor 
income separately. To do so we need to calculate individual residuals for both income types. 
Before doing so, one has to decide how to distribute mixed income (83.). Alvaredo et al. 
(2017a) argue that a 70% labor and 30% capital income split is valid as a rule of thumb. 
However, it is likely that the labor income percentage of mixed income is higher in countries 
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that have a large informal sector. Hence, we use a 90-10 split for countries with a relatively 
large informal sector5 and a 70-30 split for the remaining countries.6  
Next, one has to decide how much of the labor income and capital income residual should be 
assigned to the Top 10% and Top 5% respectively. Lakner and Milanovic (2013; 2016) allocate 
100% of the residual to the top decile. However, it is very likely that underreporting not only 
takes place at the top. Hence, Campos Vázquez and Chavez (2016) allocate 78% of the residual 
to the Top 10% and the rest to the ninth decile (lower bound scenario). Taking advantage of the 
differentiation between labor and capital income, we choose a different approach: we assign 
90% of the capital income residual to N"$ (and 95% of this 90% to N[), and 50% of the labor 
income residual to N"$ (and 66% of this 50% to N[). 
The justification for this approach is that it is well documented that capital income is highly 
concentrated at the very top, while labor income is much more evenly distributed. Moreover, 
these percentages are similar to the LIS data in countries that have negative residuals and they 
ensure that no country experiences a downward adjustment.7 Finally, the residual for disposable 
income is assigned according to each country’s post-adjustment N"$ and N[ market income 
percentages (on average, 73% of the disposable income residual is allocated to the Top 10%, 
while 85% of this 73% is allocated to the Top 5%) 
It should be stressed that the applied percentages are imprecise. However, they are reasonable 
considering the information available, and to the best of our knowledge no criteria exist that 
would aid in deciding precisely how the residual should be spread among the distribution. 
Moreover, both the household survey data and the SNA data have a degree of imprecision that 
makes it questionable whether a more sophisticated methodology yields more reliable estimates 
than the presented approach. 
  
 
5 In the following countries the share of informal employment is relatively high (i.e. above 20%): Brazil, Colombia, 
Greece, Guatemala, India, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, South Africa and South Korea.  
6 Please note that the obtained results do not change substantially if slightly different splits are taken instead (e.g. 
80-20). 
7 Especially in the case of labor income, in some countries a lower percentage of the residual going to the Top 
10% and Top 5% would result in a downward adjustment of top income shares. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Market income estimates 
Figure 1 shows the Top 10% labor and capital income shares with and without adjustment. 
The adjustment is relatively strong in many countries and also changes the order of countries. 
For example, according to LIS’s household survey data Sweden (49%), South Africa (47%), 
Egypt (43%), Guatemala and India (42%) are the five most unequal countries of the sample. 
After the adjustment Sweden drops out of the top ten and the ranking of the top five changes to 
India (69%), Mexico (62%), Guatemala (61%), South Africa (59%), Romania and Egypt (58%). 
Figure 1: Top 10% market income shares 
 
Notes: This graph shows the Top 10% market income shares prior to and after the adjustment (in ascending order 
of the adjusted income share). Labour_LIS, Capital_LIS, Labour_adj and Capital_adj refer to the top LIS labor 
income share, top LIS capital income share, top adjusted labor income share and top adjusted capital income 
share, respectively. The figures represent the latest available data (see Table 1 for further details). In countries 
marked with an * the residual is negative so no adjustment has been made. 
In general, the adjustment tends to be stronger in developing and Eastern and Southern 
European countries. This is expected given that rich countries tend to have more sophisticated 
household surveys that try to minimize underreporting at the top. Especially in Nordic countries 
the adjustment is either zero (Finland, Iceland and Sweden) or relatively small (Norway and 
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Denmark). Other countries that have a relatively small residual are the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Estonia, and Ireland, whereas the countries with the largest adjustment are 
Romania, India, Mexico, South Korea, Guatemala and Italy. The average adjustment is 11 
percentage points. 
Figure 1 also shows that most of the adjustment takes place due to the capital income residual, 
which suggests that in most countries the Top 10% especially underreport their capital income 
and/or that mainly top income households with high capital income are underrepresented in 
household surveys. However, despite the large capital income adjustment, labor income 
remains the main income source of the top decile in most countries. To be more precise, the 
pre-adjusted average share of capital income of Top 10% market income is 3%, while the post-
adjusted share increases to 17% (i.e., 83% of the top decile’s market income still stems from 
employment). Moreover, the average Top 10% capital income share as a percentage of total 
capital income changes from 46% to 80%. Especially the latter figure seems reasonable. Capital 
income is strongly related to wealth holdings and Shorrocks et al. (2016) estimate that the 
richest 10% of the global population own approximately 89% of global wealth. 
The Top 1% income shares are presented in Figure 2. The ranking of the countries is similar 
to the ranking presented in Figure 1. Many of the obtained estimates are surprisingly high. This 
is especially true for India (47%), Romania (38%), the Latin American countries (30% on 
average), and Egypt and South Africa (31%). Again, the adjustment in Nordic Countries is 
relatively small, while the Top 1% income share of Serbia, Peru, Slovakia, Italy, Hungary, 
Mexico, India, South Korea and Romania is adjusted by a factor greater than two. On average, 
the adjustment for the Top 1% is slightly stronger than the adjustment for the Top 10% (12%-
points vs. 11%-points). This is expected given that the existing literature finds that especially 
the income of the very rich is underestimated in household surveys. 
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Figure 2: Top 1% market income shares 
 
Notes: This graph shows the Top 10% market income shares prior to and after the adjustment (in ascending order 
of the adjusted income share). See Figure 1 notes. 
In line with the Top 10% estimates, the adjustment for the Top 1% occurs mainly due to the 
capital income residual. The average Top 1% capital income share as a percentage of total 
capital income increases from 21% to 64%. In other words, in nearly all sample countries the 
majority of capital incomes goes to the Top 1% according to the adjusted figures. This estimate 
appears extreme at first sight, however, in all countries the estimated Top 1% capital income 
share is significantly lower than the 89% that is reported for Sweden in LIS’s survey data. 
Moreover, this result is in line with the fact that wealth tends to be highly concentrated at the 
very top (see Goda (2017)). This adjustment also means that, in contrast to the Top 10%, capital 
income becomes the main income source of the Top 1% in most sample countries. Prior to the 
adjustment, capital income accounts for 13% of the total market income of the Top 1%, while 
this figure rises to 62% after the adjustment. The finding that the main income source of the 
very rich is capital income seems reasonable.  
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4.2 Disposable income estimates 
On average, the disposable Top 10% income share is 6 percentage points lower than the 
market income share, but the ranking of the most unequal countries is relatively similar (Figure 
3). Especially in European countries, the estimated Top 10% disposable income shares are 
much lower than the market income shares. The opposite is true for the Latin American 
countries, China and India, South Africa and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, Greece and 
Romania, and the USA. In other words, most countries with a relatively high degree of market 
income inequality have relatively low levels of redistribution, whereas countries with relatively 
low market income shares have relatively high degrees of redistribution. For the Top 1% of 
disposable income the picture is very similar (Figure 4).  
Figure 3: Top 10% disposable income shares 
 
Notes: This graph shows the Top 10% disposable income shares. LIS refers to the household survey data and 
Adjusted to the shares after the adjustment. See Figure 1 notes. 
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Figure 4: Top 1% disposable income shares 
 
Notes: The upper and lower graph show the Top 1% disposable income shares of our sample countries. Please 
see the notes to Figure 3 for further details. 
The finding that countries with relatively high levels of market inequality tend to have 
relatively low levels of redistribution is paradoxical according to the median voter theorem 
because, in theory, most citizens of highly unequal countries have a relatively large incentive 
to vote for progressive tax and transfer systems (Breyer and Ursprung, 1998). However, this 
‘paradox’ might be explained by fairness considerations (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), 
mobility expectations (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou and Ok, 2001) or distinctive political institutions 
and the electoral and political system (Bradley et al., 2003; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Mahler 
and Jesuit, 2006). 
Finally, Table 2 compares the obtained disposable top income shares to WID’s top income 
share estimates. It is important to note that the estimates are not one-hundred percent 
comparable because WID’s estimates refer to pre-tax income whereas disposable income is 
post-tax income. However, this comparison should give a rough indication about the reliability 
of the estimated disposable income shares. At the time of writing this comparison could only 
be made for 18 countries of the sample, given that WID’s estimates rely on tax data which is 
not available for most of our sample countries. 
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Table 2: Obtained disposable top income shares vs. WID top income shares 
 Top 10%Adjusted Top 10%WID Top 1%Adjusted Top 1%WID 
 Australia  44% 30% 16% 9% 
 Austria  44%  18%  
 Belgium  45%  23%  
 Brazil  53%  26%  
 Canada*  32% 41% 7% 14% 
 China  39% 38% 16% 12% 
 Colombia  52%  23% 20% 
 Czech Republic  42%  18%  
 Denmark  38% 27% 11% 6% 
 Egypt  58%  31%  
 Estonia  41%  15%  
 France  32% 30% 7% 8% 
 Finland*  49%  20%  
 Germany  44% 39% 21% 13% 
 Greece  46%  21%  
 Guatemala  61%  37%  
 Hungary  46%  19%  
 Iceland*  27%  6%  
 India  69%  47%  
 Ireland  40% 36% 16% 11% 
 Italy  55% 34% 26% 9% 
 Japan*  27% 42% 5% 11% 
 Luxembourg  39%  15%  
 Mexico  62%  36%  
 Netherlands  35% 31% 12% 6% 
 Norway  40% 28% 13% 8% 
 Peru  53%  26%  
 Poland  44%  17%  
 Romania  58%  38%  
 Russia  43%  14%  
 Serbia  45%  19%  
 Slovak Republic  46%  20%  
 Slovenia  39%  12%  
 South Africa  59% 65% 31% 19% 
 South Korea  46% 45% 23% 12% 
 Spain  44% 32% 16% 9% 
 Sweden*  49% 30% 30% 9% 
 United Kingdom  45% 41% 20% 15% 
 United States  46% 46% 21% 19% 
Notes: This table presents the obtained Top 10% and Top 1% disposable income shares, and compares them with 
the fiscal top income shares reported in the WID database (2017). In cases where no WID data is available for 
the same year, the closest available year is taken as a benchmark. 
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This comparison shows that in some cases the retrieved disposable top income share 
estimates are higher (Australia, China, France, Ireland, Italy, South Korea, and Sweden), in 
some cases they are almost identical (Colombia, Denmark, Norway, Spain, UK, and USA), and 
in some cases they are considerably lower (Canada, Germany, Japan and Netherlands) than 
WID’s fiscal top income shares. In other words, our methodology seems to have neither a 
consistent upward nor downward bias. Interestingly, there is no clear pattern among the 
countries that are not adjusted. While Canada and Japan have significantly lower top income 
shares compared to those reported in WID, Sweden’s are significantly higher. This finding is 
puzzling, considering that the household surveys of these countries at least partly rely on 
administrative tax records. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper is the first to adjust market and disposable top income shares that are reported in 
LIS with national accounts data. The non-reliance on tax data allows us to consider 39 
developed and developing countries, of which 21 countries are currently not covered by the 
widely used World Wealth & Income Database (WID). A further novelty of this study is the 
distinction between capital and labor income in the adjustment process. 
The obtained results suggest that in most countries household surveys tend to underestimate 
top income shares significantly (especially in developing countries). Notable exceptions are the 
Nordic countries, Canada and Japan. Most of the top income adjustment occurs due to the 
underestimation of capital income. The average Top 10% capital income share as a percentage 
of total capital income increases from 46% to 80% after the adjustment, while that of the Top 
1% changes from 21% to 64%. This adjustment seems reasonable, considering that wealth 
holdings are highly concentrated. A further credible outcome of the adjustment is that capital 
income becomes the main income source for the Top 1%, whereas labor income remains the 
main income source for the Top 10%. 
With regard to the obtained disposable top income shares, we find that some are similar to 
the fiscal top income shares reported by WID, but that they are in many cases significantly 
higher or lower. Although these estimates are not one-hundred percent comparable, this finding 
suggests that our easy-to-implement methodology neither has an upward nor downward bias 
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and thus seems especially suitable for countries in which no tax data is available. However, the 
presented estimates should be treated with some caution. It is not clear if some of the 
adjustments are excessively large or if they show that the true extent of inequality is vastly 
underestimated. In any case, the results suggest that there is an urgent need for more research 
on the topic and to improve the availability and quality of income data. Future research should, 
for example, try to consider country specific characteristics when using SNA data to estimate 
top income shares. 
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